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SECTION III

MOBILIZATION OVERVIEW

3-1 Introduction

1. In general terms, mobilization is the process of bringing the Armed Services to a state of readiness for operational missions, contingency operations, national emergencies or war.
2. Many view mobilization as a massive single event for organizing personnel and material resources to respond to a sudden national emergency. Mobilization is not an event. It is a process that begins with careful, comprehensive, and continual peacetime planning implemented in a series of flexible steps to assure maximum readiness to meet any contingency situations effectively.
3. The United States maintains Reserve Component (RC) forces sufficient to meet increased defense needs. The capability of the United States to expand its active force rapidly and efficiently through mobilization is essential in deterring potential enemies and reassuring our allies. Potential enemies must be convinced that the United States can and will mobilize and project a total (active, reserve and civilian) force in time to influence the early stages of a conflict. The RC's must be visibly able to mobilize in the required time, at the right place, and in a state of readiness to meet commitments. Likewise, given the present reliance on DoD civilians and contracted technical support personnel for weapons system support and other functional needs, the Navy manpower mobilization process must recognize and include civilian mobilization in the planning and execution process.
4. Terminology associated with mobilization is sometimes confusing, and varies among services. Appendix D lists the terms and definitions that frame all Navy personnel mobilization documents. These terms are consistent with DoD standards established in DODD 1235.10 of 1 July 1995, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve.

3-2 Force Levels and Mobilization Recall

1. There are four general force levels of the Armed Services:
 - a. The active Armed Forces.
 - b. The RC in an active status (SELRES/Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)/Standby Reserve (S1). When authorized, they augment active forces up to the approved force levels. Together, the Selected Reserve and IRR comprise the Ready Reserve.

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c. The RC augmentation forces in an inactive status (Standby Reserve (S2)) that increase the Armed Forces beyond the approved existing force structure.

d. The RC augmentation forces in a retired status (USN retired/retired USNR/Fleet Reserve).

2. The DoD further defines four distinct levels of mobilization. In increasing order of magnitude they are:

- a. Selective Mobilization.
- b. Partial Mobilization.
- c. Full Mobilization.
- d. Total Mobilization.

3. Subordinate to mobilization are voluntary and involuntary recall. Voluntary recall is termed ADSW. It is constrained by peacetime budget levels. Involuntary recall is achieved under Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority discussed below. It is not constrained by peacetime budget levels but by service allocations based upon requirements.

3-3 Levels of Mobilization

1. As the operational tempo increases from peacetime to crisis or national emergency, various levels of voluntary and involuntary manpower mobilization may take place to provide the military capabilities required. Increases in operating force activity should parallel concurrent mobilization of resources and personnel. Since the system must be prepared to increase its output of necessary resources at any time, steps must be taken far in advance of a potential crisis to ensure responsive action.

2. Mobilization planning must ensure that associated logistical functions are identified and incorporated as part of the planning process. Navy manpower mobilizations may be either voluntary or involuntary. OPNAVINST 1001.20A, Standardized Policy and Procedures for the Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) and One-Year Recall (OYR) Program, describes voluntary mobilizations used for contingency or peacetime mission support.

3. Involuntary mobilizations include:

- a. Selective Mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces by Congress and/or the President to include RC units,

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individual reservists, and the associated support resources to meet the requirements of domestic emergencies not the result of an enemy attack.

b. Partial Mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than one million Ready Reserve personnel for 24 months) to include RC units, individual reservists, retirees, and the associated support resources to meet the requirements of war or other national emergencies involving an external threat to national security.

c. Full Mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces by Congress and the President to the existing approved force structure. It includes all SELRES, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the associated support resources to meet the requirements of war or other national emergencies involving an external threat to the national security.

d. Total Mobilization. Expansion of the Armed Forces by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units, personnel and associated support resources beyond the existing force structure, to meet the total requirements of war or other national emergencies involving an external threat to the national security.

e. PSRC. Another means available to expand existing forces for operational mission requirements. The President may augment active forces by involuntarily recalling units and individuals of the SELRES to active duty. The President can activate a total of 200,000 members from all services for up to 270 days. DoD interpretation of the PSRC authority allows the 270 day period to be performed under one single or multiple recall periods. The period of recall begins when members leave home, and ends upon their return home. PSRC is not considered a mobilization (defined as a "call-up") and does not require declaration of a national emergency to invoke. With use of the PSRC, the President must report to Congress within 24 hours on the circumstances and the anticipated use of the recalled forces.

3-4 Mobilization Authority

1. Mobilization/recall authority resides with the President and/or the Congress as shown in figure 3-1. The SECDEF, recommends to the President and Congress the mobilization authority required to support a given contingency, OPLAN or national emergency. The basis of this recommendation is the advice and recommendation of the Service Secretaries and the JCS. SECDEF directs mobilization of RC units and manpower through the military departments. All legal

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authority to initiate mobilization, including Executive Orders, Federal Regulations, departmental regulations, and interagency agreements, stem from United States Code (U.S.C.) and Public Law (Pub. L). Legal authority for mobilization actions can be available in peacetime, after a presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency, or in time of war. Navy will use the recall and mobilization authorities of 10 U.S.C. to augment active component forces with RC personnel when deemed necessary and appropriate by SECNAV.

MOBILIZATION AUTHORITIES					
PUBLIC LAW	MOB LEVEL	INVOKED BY	REASON	APPLICABLE TO	LIMITATIONS
10 U.S.C. 12301 (a)	Total/Full	Congress	War, National Emergency or otherwise authorized by law	Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, Retired	Duration of war or emergency plus 6 months
10 U.S.C. 6485	Total/Full	Congress	War or National Emergency	Fleet Reserve	Duration of war or emergency plus 6 months
10 U.S.C. 12302	Partial	President	National Emergency	Ready Reserve (SELRES/IMA/IRR)	1,000,000/ 24 Months
*10 U.S.C. 12304	PSRC	President	Operational Requirements	SELRES/IMA Involuntary	200,000/ 270 days
10 U.S.C. 6485 (a)(2)	Selective	President	National Emergency	Fleet Reserve	None
10 U.S.C. 688	Selective	SECNAV	National Defense Interests	Retired members of the Navy with 20 years of active duty and Fleet Reserve	None
10 U.S.C. 12301 (b)	Selective	SECNAV	No Purpose Specified	Ready Reserve	15 Days

Figure 3-1

*Constitutes call-up and may be employed prior to mobilization

2. Some statutes permit action not requiring a declaration of national emergency or a wartime situation. The President, or in some cases, a Service Secretary, may invoke these statutes. Examples of such situations include the PSRC action as previously cited and the recall of retired personnel by the SECNAV.

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3. The President, Congress, or both, can declare a national emergency. Either the declaration of national emergency or the subsequent execution orders must specify what authority the President will invoke. Thus, he cannot simply declare an emergency and then automatically assume all associated powers; rather, he must articulate these powers. Congress may terminate the President's emergency authority at any time by concurrent resolution. Congress also retains authority to review the declaration and situation at 6-month intervals.

3-5 Overview of the Mobilization Process

1. When a crisis develops, the following sequence of events and mobilization flow as shown in figure 3-2 take place.

a. The CINC/Unified Commander of the affected geographic region notifies the CJCS after consolidation and validation of gaining command requirements.

b. As the principal military advisor to the President, CJCS coordinates with the CINCs and the NCA - composed of the President and SECDEF - to select a course of action (COA). This COA is either derived from an existing OPLAN or will be planned and executed under crisis action procedures. Force requirements (including active and reserve combat, combat support and combat service support forces) required to execute the approved COA must be determined.

c. The size of the COA force will determine the method used to provide the force. This may be limited to reserve volunteers, or may require involuntary reserve recall or mobilization.

d. Navy unit and individual requirements are forwarded by the CINCs, Navy component commanders, and sponsors to CNO.

e. Navy requirements are coordinated with the Director for Logistics, Joint Staff (J-4), the staff proponent for mobilization on the JCS. J-4 consolidates all services reserve requirements and forwards them to CJCS. CJCS informs the NCA of service requirements.

f. Once the NCA has determined that involuntary activation is required, the President may invoke an appropriate force augmentation authority. Partial mobilization and higher requires the declaration of a National Emergency.

[illegible]

Figure 3-2

g. In an Executive Order invoking PSRC, the President authorizes SECDEF to initiate a call-up. SECDEF allocates a portion of the authorized personnel for call-up to each of the Service Secretaries based on reserve force requirement projections. The Executive Order also normally allows the Secretary of Transportation to activate Coast Guard personnel, unless the Coast Guard is operating as a service within the Department of the Navy.

h. The supported CINC converts the approved COA into an OPORD, reviews force and unit-related support requirements, resolves shortfalls and limitations, notifies the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) that force requirements are ready for sourcing, and publishes the TPFDD letter of instruction (LOI).

i. USTRANSCOM furnishes air, land, and sea transportation to support the OPORD, by applying transportation assets against the transportation requirements identified by the supported commander. Air and sea channels for movement of non-unit sustainment and personnel are established, and schedules for air and sea are

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created. USTRANSCOM components validate transportation movement planned for the first increment, adjust deployment flow and reschedule as required, and continue to develop transportation schedules for subsequent increments.

j. SECNAV will delegate the reserve call-up/mobilization authority to the CNO for execution.

2. On receiving the order to mobilize, CNO (N3/N5) executes the authorized call-up/mobilization.

a. CNO (N3/N5) reviews CINC-validated requirements for priority, policy, and appropriate assets. CNO (N3/N5) coordinates with CNO (N1) and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) to decide how to meet naval requirements (active Navy, SELRES, civilian, IRR, Standby Reserve or retired personnel manpower).

b. CNO (N1), CNO (N3/N5), Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) and CMC coordinate to determine Navy medical augmentation requirements for Marine Corps ground and air units, gunfire liaison personnel, chaplains, Religious Specialists, and other augmentation requirements.

c. CNO (N3/N5) receives and acts on incoming requests for involuntary reserve recall/mobilization. CNO (N3/N5) coordinates with CINCs, Navy component commanders and sponsors as necessary to validate, integrate and prioritize the requirements.

d. CNO (N3/N5), with CNO (N095) assist, will transmit the SELRES requirements to COMNAVRESFOR.

e. If a recall authorization higher than PSRC is invoked and the requirements cannot be met with the SELRES, requirements will be forwarded by CNO (N3/N5) to CNO (N1) to be filled by PIM assets. CNO (N1) (who also is CHNAVPERS) will transmit the PIM requirements via BUPERS to CO, NAVRESPERSSEN to identify and activate qualified personnel to fill the requirements.

f. BUPERS will issue personnel and order-writing policy guidance to COMNAVRESFOR and Naval Reserve Personnel Center (NRPC), and initiate preparation of the NMPS to conduct MOB processing.

3. Upon receipt of a mobilization alert or mobilization execution order, commands and units execute mobilization plans.

4. Within Navy, NMPSs will mobilize all inactive duty military personnel, DoD civilian or other personnel as directed. Specific information on the NMPS process is in section IV. Appendix E identifies specific steps in mobilization when processing reservists and PIM for mobilization.